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Philosophical orthodoxy holds that pains are mental states, taking this to reect the
ordinary conception of pain. Despite this, evidence is mounting that English speak-
ers do not tend to conceptualize pains in this way; rather, they tend to treat pains as
being bodily states. We hypothesize that this is driven by two primary factors—the
phenomenology of feeling pains and the surface grammar of pain reports.ere is
reason to expect that neither of these factors is culturally specic, however, and thus
reason to expect that the empirical ndings for English speakers will generalize to
other cultures and other languages. In this article we begin to test this hypothesis,
reporting the results of two cross-cultural studies comparing judgments about the
location of referred pains (cases where the felt location of the pain diverges from
the bodily damage) between two groups—Americans and South Koreans—that we
might otherwise expect to dier in how they understand pains. In line with our
predictions, we nd that both groups tend to conceive of pains as bodily states.
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Pain is a near-universal feature of human life. Almost every person experi-
ences acute pains for shorter or longer periods of time.1 Despite pain being
essentially universal, there are also notable dierences within populations.
For example, how intense pains are felt to be and how people respond to
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1 Some people are fully insensitive to pain, a phenomenon known as congenital pain insen-
sitivity (Nagasako et al. 2003).
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pains depend on various parameters including both genetic and environ-
mental factors (Nielsen et al. 2009). And during the last few decades, re-
searchers have conducted cross-cultural studies that have revealed the im-
portance of cultural factors for the perception of pain and subsequent pain
behavior (Callister 2003; Moore and Brodsgaard 1999; Wierzbicka 2014).
Given these results, a further question presents itself: Do people in dier-
ent cultures conceive of pains dierently?
Of particular interest in philosophy has been the question of where
people actually locate their pains—hence the title of this paper: Where is
your pain?While this question sounds perhaps rather innocent, it has wide-
ranging consequences for the conception of pains. If people think of pains
as being located in body parts, then pains are being conceived of as bodily
states. In contrast, most philosophical theories of pain take pains to bemen-
tal states.2 In this paper we will present the results of a pair of cross-cultural
studies investigating the location of pains.
Investigating people’s concept of pain in a cross-cultural manner is of
both theoretical and practical importance.ere are several reasons for this.
First, the question of whether pains are bodily states or mental states has
received considerable attention in the philosophy of mind.3 We will argue
that cross-cultural studies on people’s conception of pain have the poten-
tial to signicantly advance this debate. Second, within the last ve years,
researchers have started to empirically investigate the ordinary conception
of dierent mental states, including sensory states like feeling pain (as dis-
cussed in the next section).4 ese studies provide surprising results that
cast doubt on assumptions about the ordinary conception of pain found
in the philosophical literature. Corroborating these results through cross-
cultural studies would bolster the position that emerges from these stud-
2 Two clarications are in order. First, when talking about pains as mental states, we do not
intend to endorse any non-physicalist account of the mind. us, minds are almost cer-
tainly identical or supervenient on physical or functional properties of the brain. Second,
brains are, of course, a part of the body.e claim that pains are bodily states should be
understood as locating pains in parts of the body outside of the central nervous system.
3 See (Aydede 2009), for an overview of this literature.
4 Much of this research focuses on how people understand and attribute mental states that
philosophers typically treat as being phenomenally conscious. See, for example, (Knobe
and Prinz 2008; Sytsma and Machery 2009; Sytsma and Machery 2010; Huebner 2010;
Arico et al. 2011; Jack and Robbins 2012; Sytsma 2012; Talbot 2012; Sytsma and Machery
2012; Buckwalter and Phelan 2013; Phelan et al. 2013; Fiala et al. 2014; Sytsma 2014b). For
a recent survey, see (Sytsma 2014a).is work falls under the thriving sub-area of exper-
imental philosophy of mind. For an accessible review of some of the work that has been
done in this area, see (Machery and Sytsma 2011). For a more extended survey, see (Sytsma
2010b) and the chapter on “Philosophy of Mind” in (Sytsma and Buckwalter 2016). For a
collection of cutting-edge articles, see (Sytsma 2014c).
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ies.ird, cross-cultural studies on emotions have revealed that cultural el-
ements inuence how people think about and classify emotions (Markus
and Kitayama 1991; Mesquita and Ellsworth 2001).e impact of culture on
conceptions of pain has received comparatively little attention. Our studies
hope to help ll this lacuna. Finally, medical practitioners are increasingly
required to provide care and treatment to people from very dierent cul-
tural backgrounds. It is therefore important to know how and in which ways
people’s concept of pain depends on the person’s cultural background (Free
2002).
Here is how we will proceed. We begin in Section 1 by introducing the
philosophical debate that forms the background for our studies and argue
that culture is unlikely to signicantly aect where people tend to locate
pains. In Section 2, we set-up the cross-cultural comparison we make, pro-
viding reason to expect that if culture does in fact have a signicant eect on
where laypeople locate pains, then we should expect to see a notable dier-
ence between Americans and South Koreans in this regard.We then present
the results of our cross-cultural studies in Section 3 testing our prediction.
e implications of these studies are discussed in Section 4.
1. Pains and places
In 20th century analytic philosophy, pains have usually been classied as
mental states, and this has been assumed to correspond with the ordinary
conception of pain. In fact, awareness of pain has been taken to be the proto-
typical case of introspective awareness, according to which a person becomes
aware of a mental state (Reuter 2016). Moreover, many debates on themind-
body problem have selected pain to be a kind of mental state for which re-
duction to a brain state seems particularly hard (e.g., Jackson 1980). While
these discussions oen merely assume the classication of pains as mental
states, very few arguments have been put forward to justify this classica-
tion.
Most importantly, it has been argued that common sense tells us that
pains are like phenomenal mental states and unlike worldly objects in that
pains are (i) necessarily private, (ii) subjective, and (iii) cannot be halluci-
nated (Aydede 2006).Worldly objects like elephants are not exclusive to one
person, they do not depend for their existence on being perceived, and they
can be dreamed or hallucinated. Hence, they do not fulll any of the three
criteria of phenomenal mental states. In contrast, it has been asserted that
pains satisfy all three criteria. First, pains are said to be exclusive to a single
person. (Have you ever, non-metaphorically, shared a painwith another per-
son?) Second, it is claimed that the notion of an unfelt, mind-independent
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pain is absurd.5 ird, it is held that while people may hallucinate objects
like elephants, pains are not the kind of entities that can be hallucinated.6
Clearly, you may be uncertain about whether a sensation is truly painful as
opposed to merely uncomfortable, for example; but it is asserted that if you
feel a pain then you are also undeniably having a pain.
Since (Aydede 2006) and (Hill 2006), the simple picture of the com-
monsense conception of pain we have just described has come under some
scrutiny. Both authors hold that there is a dominant strand in our ordinary
conception that takes pains to bemental states; but, they also hold that there
is another thread that oers a very dierent picture.is picture is thought
to correspond with the phenomenology of feeling pain and the semantics
of pain reports. Starting with the semantics of pain reports, Hill argues that
the view that pains are mental states seems to conict with the way we speak
about pains. In standard pain reports, like ‘there is a pain in my ankle,’ the
pains are clearly being located in body parts and not in the mind. Further,
the phenomenology of pain, or theway pains feel, seems to support the point
drawn from the semantics of pain reports. It is reasonable to suppose that
when people locate a pain in a body part, they do so at least in part because
that is where the pain is felt to be. When a person says that ‘there is a pain
in my ankle,’ this would seem to reect that she feels a pain as being located
in the ankle.us, on the one hand, pains appear to be bodily states that are
located in a person’s body; on the other hand, pains are standardly classied
as mental states.is tension has come to be known as the paradox of pain
(Aydede 2006; Hill 2006).
Most philosophers have downplayed the relevance of the phenomeno-
logy of pain and the semantics of pain reports, or have tried to nd alter-
native explanations of why people speak as if pains have bodily locations
(Aydede 2009; Tye 2006). However, in recent years experimental philoso-
phers have begun to investigate whether the commonsense conception of
pain indeed supports a view of pains as mental states.e results have not
supported the mental state conception of pain advocated by the majority of
philosophers and scientists. Instead, the results give us reason to reconsider
the importance of the phenomenology of pain and semantics of pain reports
in shaping the ordinary conception of pain.
We will briey review a few of the key ndings. Expanding on sug-
gestions about the ordinary conception of colors in (Sytsma 2009), Sytsma
(2010a) presented evidence from a series of survey studies challenging the
view that pains are necessarily private. In one study, he asked participants to
consider a case in which a pair of conjoined twins who share the lower half
5 See (Reuter and Sytsma manuscript) for an extended discussion.
6 See (Reuter et al. 2014) for an extended discussion.
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of their body, accidentally kick a rock that is hidden in the grass. When the
participants were asked whether the twins felt one and the same pain or two
dierent pains, a substantial majority answered that the twins felt one and
the same pain.
In other research, Reuter et al. (2014) investigated the claim that the or-
dinary conception of pain rules out the possibility of pain hallucinations. In
stark contrast to the philosophical consensus, a signicant majority of the
participants surveyed answered that pain hallucinations are possible. Reuter
and Sytsma (manuscript) have conducted a large series of studies indicating
that a signicant majority of English-speakers hold that it is possible to have
unfelt pains.ey found that a signicant majority of participants hold that
the pain continues even when the patient isn’t feeling it. Employing an indi-
rect method, Reuter (2011) used a web-based corpus analysis to examine the
way people express strong and mild pains in English. He found that when
pains are strong, people state that they ‘have’ a pain, whereas mild pains
are usually expressed by phrases like ‘feeling pain.’7 is distinction seems
to map the appearance-reality distinction that is observed in the traditional
sense modalities. If the analogy goes through, it seems as if English speakers
distinguish the appearance from the reality of pain, and thus do not regard
pains as mental states.
e studies just discussed cast signicant doubt on the assumption that
the commonsense conception of pain takes pains to be mental states. In do-
ing so, it raises serious doubts about whether there is a paradox of pain in the
rst place. Recall that the paradox arises because the mental state view is in
tension with the phenomenology of feeling pain and the semantics of pain
reports, which would seem to be more consistent with a bodily conception
of pain. Flipping things around, the phenomenology of feeling pain and the
semantics of pain reports would lead us to predict that people would tend
to conceive of pains as being bodily states: we would expect that people who
grow up feeling pains as being located in body parts, and who are taught to
refer to pains as being located in body parts, would be likely to form a bodily
conception of pain. And insofar as these two factors are common across hu-
man cultures we would expect the bodily conception of pain to be common
across human cultures as well.
With regard to the phenomenology of pain, it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that the way people feel their pains is a near-universal facet of human
pain perception. While some studies have demonstrated the impact of cul-
ture on the felt intensity of pains, no study exists (that we know of) that
demonstrates an eect of culture on the felt location of pain.us, if bodily
damage occurs in a person’s elbow, the ensuing pain will be felt to be located
7 is nding has also been replicated for German speakers (Reuter et al. manuscript).
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in the elbow regardless of whether a person has grown up in aWestern soci-
ety or within an Asian community. A similar argument can be made about
the semantics of pain reports. Diller (1980) and others have detailed many
dierences in the semantics of pain reports between dierent cultures. How-
ever, none of these studies show that the reported location of physical pains
changes from one culture to the next.
While the empirical evidence discussed above has focused on the judg-
ments of native English speakers, and predominantly Americans, we do not
believe that the two factors supporting the bodily conception of pain are cul-
turally specic. As such, we predict that the types of judgments found in the
empirical literature to date will turn out to be culturally robust. Our goal in
this paper is to begin to test this prediction by comparing judgments about
the location of pain between American and South Korean participants.
In order to investigate the role of the phenomenology of pain as well as
the role of the location of the bodily disorder independently of each other,
we decided to test people’s views on the nature of pain in regards to a phe-
nomenon known as “referred pain.” Referred pains are pains that are felt to
be located in a place that diverges from the location of the painful stimu-
lus (Arendt-Nielsen and Svensson 2001). We can distinguish three primary
positions that one could take with regard to cases of referred pains. First,
people might locate the pain where the bodily disorder is, such that the phe-
nomenology plays a sub-ordinate role. Second, people may identify the lo-
cation of the pain with the felt location regardless of the bodily disorder.
ird, people may entertain a mental-state view according to which they lo-
cate the pain in the mind instead of in either bodily location. Whatever the
outcome, the referred pain case has the advantage of disentangling various
aspects of pain that usually co-occur. us, an empirical study on people’s
views on referred pain can provide important insights into the structure of
people’s concept of pain as well as identifying the factors that inuence peo-
ple’s thinking on the nature of pain.
2. East andWest
Our goal in this paper is to begin to test the prediction that recent empirical
ndings suggesting against the assumption that ordinary people hold amen-
tal state conception of pain are robust across cultures. In this section we will
argue that South Koreans form a suitable comparison case to Americans for
purposes of investigating this prediction. First, we note that while theWest-
ern tradition has been dominated by Aristotelian and Protestant principles
(Schubert andKlein 2011), many East Asian cultures—and specically South
Korea—have a Confucian background (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Varnum
et al. 2010). Second, work in cultural psychology indicates that there are
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large, systematic dierences in cognitive styles betweenWesterners and East
Asians. Both of these factors might plausibly be predicted to have an inu-
ence on the concept of pain. ird, there is an interesting, culture-bound
somatization syndrome—Hwa-byung—found only in Korean women. e
symptomsofHwa-byung include emotions, especially anger, being expressed
as physical pain in the chest (Park 2004), which is distinguished frommajor
depression and other somatic disorders (Kim et al. 2013). Our goal in this
section is not to make specic predictions about what the common concep-
tion of pain is amongst South Koreans, but to note that prior to conducting
empirical work on the topic one might reasonably expect there to be signi-
cant dierences between Americans and South Koreans with regard to how
they conceptualize pain, including whether they tend to locate pains in the
body or in the mind.
2.1 Individualism versus collectivism
Members of Western societies, including most American and European
countries, usually regard themselves as independent from objects and other
people in the world (Hofstede 2011).ey tend to have individualist cultures.
In contrast, East Asian communities represent collectivist cultures that are
oriented towards the Confucian principles ofmutual relation and social har-
mony (Nisbett et al. 2001;omas 2005).ese dierences in Western and
East Asian cultures are perhaps most strongly observable when consider-
ing people’s concept of the self: members of individualist societies generally
have an independent self-concept whereas members of collectivist cultures
have an interdependent self-concept.8 For example, Markus and Kitayama
(1991) argue that whereas people from individualist cultures regard them-
selves as largely autonomous beings, East Asians have an extended sense of
social duty.
is focus on the interdependence of oneself with others, as well
as the heightened importance of social duty, also manifests itself in a
phenomenon known as “face.” e basic idea is that being appreciated
by one’s own social group is an important aspect of the interdepen-
dent self-concept (Martinez Mateo et al. 2013; omas 2005) that leads
individuals to avoid public embarrassment and to maintain a positive
social image (Schroll-Machl 2008). Saving face—i.e., maintaining one’s
social image—is highly associated with both a hierarchical system and
a male-dominated family system (Lee et al. 2012). In this social system,
people are discouraged from expressing their negative feelings and emo-
8 A table summarizing the key dierences between these dierent self-conceptions can be
found in (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 230).
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tions about the social system.9 In South Korea, the suppression of feelings
applies particularly strongly to married women (Ketterer et al. 2010). If in-
deed the expression of one’s emotions is taken to destroy harmony within
both the family and the society at large, then it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that many South Koreans will also consider their physical pains to be
private, subjective states that have to be coped with on a personal level.
2.2 Analytic versus holistic styles of thinking
According to Nisbett et al. (2001) we can distinguish between Western and
East Asian cultures in terms of the former tending to show analytic patterns
of thought while the latter tends to show holistic patterns of thought. As
holistic ideas reect equality and continuity, they provoke thinking in con-
stellations, relations, and contexts. us, East Asian cultures perceive ob-
jects as parts of a whole. Western cultures, on the other hand, concentrate
on the distinctiveness of objects—oen disregarding the context in which
they appear—and prefer to provide abstract causal explanations.
ese dierences in patterns of thought have also been applied to the ex-
planations oered for people’s actions (Fiebich and Coltheart 2015). While
individuals in Western cultures are more likely to explain other people’s be-
havior by referring to mental states like a person’s wishes and opinions, “so-
cial identity” explanations play a greater role in EastAsian cultures like South
Korea. Instead of focusing on an individual’s intentions to act in a certain
way, East Asians tend to focus on an individual’s social role and character.
For example, if we imagine a girl, Susi, reaching for a doll, East Asians are
more likely to explain this through social identity (‘that’s what girls do’) than
reference to mental states (‘Susi wants to play with the doll’). Noting the
East Asian tendency for taking a holistic view of objects, we might suppose
that their conception of pain will tend to be driven by recognition of so-
cial norms rather than personal judgment.is is further suggested by the
phenomenon of Hwa-byung discussed below.
2.3 Location of pain and Confucianism: Hwa-byung
Not only has it been argued that Confucian-bound cultures inuence peo-
ple’s conception of self and others, there is also evidence that they directly af-
fect people’s handling of states of emotions and pains.is is indicated by an
empirical phenomenon called Hwa-byung.e pain-related illness is listed
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as
9 e Korean saying “live three years like being speech-impaired, three years like being hear-
ing impaired, and another three years like being visually impaired” epitomizes the cultural
importance of this facet of Korean culture.
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a culture-bound syndrome. Hwa-byung occurs with some frequency in Ko-
rean middle-aged women, but not in members of the Japanese or Chinese
cultures.10
Patients suering from Hwa-byung, consistently report pain in the up-
per to middle part of their chest (Lin 1983). However, medically, Hwa-byung
is classied as a mental illness with the symptoms being associated with the
suppression of emotional distress, especially including anger, resulting from
the position of women in society. Scientists assume that this suppression is
due to socio-cultural and psychological factors (Park et al. 2012). Since the
Confucian idea of social harmony prescribes cooperation as the primary
value, Korean women in their middle ages suppress emotion and anger to
a much greater extent than has been observed in other societies. As for the
psychological side, Park et al. (2012) found that patients indicate a temporary
inability to suppress anger, grief, guilt, shame or injury. Given that it is not
socially acceptable for women to express their bad feelings and emotions
because those are regarded as pushing against family harmony and social
stability, Hwa-byung itself can be regarded as an attempt to maintain the
Confucian principles underlying the collectivist culture.
Coupled with the principle of keeping one’s face, patients have nomeans
to express their emotions and the extent to which they are suering. And, we
suggest, this inability to express states of suering in South Korea is likely to
inuence the very idea of suering—and with it the concept of pain—that
South Koreans operate with. In sharp contrast, Americans are allowed, and
oen encouraged, to express their negative feelings—even when the cause
of those feelings is rooted inside the family or society. As such, one might
suspect that the concept of pain will dier signicantly between the United
States and South Korea.
3. Cross-cultural studies
We saw in Section 1 that, contra the assumptions of many philosophers,
evidence is mounting that the ordinary conception of pain amongst adult
Americans does not tend to treat pains as being mental states, but instead
tends to locate them in body parts. And we hypothesized that the phe-
nomenology of pain as well as the semantics of pain reports are the two
driving factors behind the prevalence of such a bodily conception of pain. In
Section 2, we argued that South Koreans are a good test case to investigate
whether the ndings for English speakers generalize to other cultures and
to other languages.
10 Interestingly, while Confucianism originates from China (Xiaohong and Qingyuan 2013),
it is currently most pronounced in South Korea.
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In this section we describe the results of two new cross-cultural studies
that begin to empirically compare the lay conceptions of pain between par-
ticipants in the United States and South Korea. To do this we assessed peo-
ple’s judgments about a type of case not previously tested in the literature—
referred pains.e case of referred pain is an especially interesting example
given our speculation about the factors driving the ordinary conception of
pain: while pains are typically felt to be located in the same place as bodily
damage, this correlation is broken for cases of referred pain.us, while our
hypothesis leads us to predict that both Americans and South Koreans will
be similar in tending to hold a bodily conception of pain rather than a men-
tal state conception, it does not make a prediction about the relative weight
that each group will put on each of these two factors. And, in fact, we might
expect that cases of referred pains will be one of the places where cultural
dierences with regard to the conception of pain will be most pronounced.
For purposes of comparison, we also assessed people’s judgments about
a case of “referred sound”—a case in which where a sound seems to be com-
ing from diverges from the actual source of the sound. Linguistic practice
oen seems to treat pains as being located in extra-mental space.e same
holds for other sense modalities such as audition.e surface grammar for
talk of hearing sounds in English, for example, seems to treat them as per-
ceptual objects located outside of themind.With regard to pains, however, it
has been repeatedly argued (e.g., Aydede 2009) that the surface grammar is
misleading when it comes to the ordinary concept of pain, with that concept
diering from other sensory concepts like sound in taking pains to be men-
tal states. In contrast, we predict that judgments about sound will be similar
to judgments about pain in following the surface grammar.
3.1 Study 1
In our rst study, participants were given two probes on separate pages. One
probe detailed a case of referred pain, while the other detailed a case of re-
ferred sound. e order of the two probes was randomly determined. e
probes were presented in English to a group of American participants and
in Korean to a group of South Korean participants.e English versions of
the probes read as follows:
Pain: Jack does not feel well and is brought to the hospital. When the
doctor asks him to describe the situation, Jack states that he feels a
dull pain in his le arm.e experienced doctor knows immediately
that Jack most likely has an infection of one of his internal organs.
Aer running a series of tests, the doctor determines that Jack has a
liver infection.e doctor explains to Jack that despite how it feels to
him, there is nothing at all wrong with his le arm, and that the real
problem is with his liver.
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Which of the following statements do you most agree with?
A.e pain is in Jack’s liver and it merely feels to him as if it is in his
le arm.
B.e pain is in Jack’s le arm, just where he feels it to be.
C. e pain is in Jack’s mind, and neither in his le arm nor in his
liver.
D.ere is no pain—not in Jack’s liver, in Jack’s le arm, or in Jack’s
mind.
E. None of the above: I don’t agree with any of these statements.
Sound: Jim is walking down the street when it sounds to him as if
there is an ambulance siren on his le.When he looks to his le, how-
ever, he doesn’t see anything. An experienced scientist is sitting on a
bench next to Jim and notices his behavior.e scientist knows im-
mediately that the ambulance is probably on Jim’s right. Aer looking
around and listening more closely, the scientist determines that the
ambulance is in the parking ramp on Jim’s right.e scientist explains
to Jim that despite how it sounds to him, the siren isn’t coming from
his le, and that the ambulance is actually on his right.
Which of the following statements do you most agree with?
A.e sound is on Jim’s right and it merely sounds to him as if it is
on his le.
B.e sound is on Jim’s le, just where he hears it to be.
C.e sound is in Jim’s mind, and neither on his le nor his right.
D.ere is no sound—not on Jim’s right, on Jim’s le, or in Jim’smind.
E. None of the above: I don’t agree with any of these statements.11
e rst two options give the pain/sound a physical location (either where
the source of the pain/sound is or where the pain/sound seems to be), while
the third gives it amental location.Aer answering each question, theAmer-
ican participants were asked to briey explain their answer.
Responses were collected online and restricted to participants who were
18 years of age or older, who completed the survey, had not taken a survey
through the website previously, and had at most minimal training in phi-
losophy.12 Responses for the English version of the probes were restricted
11 e Korean translations of the probes are given in the appendix.
12 Responses for the English version of the probes were collected through
http://www.philosophicalpersonality.com while responses for the Korean version of
the probes were collected through Qualtrics (http://www.qualtrics.com). Participants
were counted as having more than minimal training in philosophy for the American sam-
ple if they were philosophy majors, had completed a degree with a major in philosophy, or
had taken graduate-level courses in philosophy; participants were counted as having more
than minimal training in philosophy for the South Korean sample if they had graduated
or were going to graduate with an undergraduate degree in philosophy.
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to participants born and currently residing in the United States, while re-
sponses for the Korean version of the probes were restricted to South Kore-
ans. We collected responses from 190 Americans and from 196 South Kore-
ans.13 e results are shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Results of Study 1 in terms of percentage of participants from each group
selecting each answer choice; pain case on top, sound case on bottom.
13 e American participants were 71.6%women, with an average age of 40.9 years; the South
Korean participants were 64.3% women, with an average age of 30.0.
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3.1.1 Pain
We will begin by looking at the results for the pain probes. We predicted
that (1) the American participants would tend to locate the pain in a body
part and not in the mind, (2) the South Korean participants would also tend
to locate the pain in a body part and not in the mind, and (3) that the two
groups would be similar in this regard.e data support each of these three
predictions.
First, we found that a signicant majority of the American participants
located the pain in Jack’s body by selecting one of the rst twooptions (77.4%);
in contrast, only a small minority located the pain in Jack’s mind (4.2%).14
Second, as with the Americans, we found that a signicant majority of the
South Korean participants located the pain in Jack’s body (81.6%); in con-
trast, only a small minority located the pain in Jack’s mind (5.6%).15 ird, it
follows from the previous two ndings that the American and South Korean
participants were similar with regard to locating the pain in a body part and
not in the mind. Further, we found no signicant dierences either when
comparing the percentage of participants in each group selecting Options
A or B (physical locations), or the percentage of participants in each group
selecting Option C (mental location).16
As noted above, our hypothesis did not lead us to make a prediction
about the relative preference that Americans and South Koreans might have
for either of the two bodily locations for pain.at said, it is worth noting
that our data suggests that there might be a small cultural dierence here:
South Koreans were signicantly more likely than Americans to select Op-
tion A (a dierence of 13.5 percentage points), while Americans were more
likely than South Koreans to select Option B (a dierence of 9.3 percent-
age points; this dierence was borderline signicant).17 Further, while only
slightly more of the American participants selected Option A than selected
14 Option A or B: χ2 = 55.8368, p = 3.937e− 14, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.5792, where a value
of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as
a large eect); Option C: χ2 = 157.5211, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 1.157, where
a value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
15 Option A or B: χ2 = 77.1888, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.685, where a value of
0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as a
large eect); Option C: χ2 = 152.699, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 1.092, where a
value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
16 Option A or B: χ2 = 0.8317, p = 0.3618, two-tailed; Option C: χ2 = 0.1609, p = 0.6883,
two-tailed.With sample sizes of 190 and 196, for each comparisonwe had a power of 0.9984
to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s h = 0.5).
17 Option A: χ2 = 6.5541, p = 0.01046, two-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.2719, where a value of 0.2 is
ordinarily classied as a small eect and a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium
eect); Option B: χ2 = 3.4223, p = 0.06432, two-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.1999, where a value
of 0.2 or below is ordinarily classied as a small eect).
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OptionB,more than twice asmany of the SouthKorean participants selected
Option A than selected Option B.us, while both groups showed a slight
preference for locating the pain in the liver compared to the arm, this pref-
erence was much stronger amongst the South Korean participants. In fact, if
we look at those participants who selected one of the two physical locations,
we nd a signicant dierence between the responses of the Americans and
the South Koreans.18
3.1.2 Sound
While our focus in this article is on the ordinary conception of pain, we also
asked participants about a case of “referred sound.”e two factors that led
us to predict that Americans and South Koreans would be similar in treat-
ing pains as physical rather than mental hold for other sensory modalities
as well. As such, the referred sound probes serve as an additional test. Cor-
responding with our predictions for the previous case, we predicted that (1)
the American participants would tend to locate the sound in the world and
not in the mind, (2) the South Korean participants would also tend to locate
the sound in the world and not in the mind, and (3) that the two groups
would be similar in this regard. Once again, the data support each of these
three predictions.
First, we found that a signicant majority of the American participants
located the sound in Jim’s surroundings by selecting one of the rst two op-
tions (78.4%); in contrast, only a small minority located the sound in Jim’s
mind (1.1%).19 Second, as with the Americans, we found that a signicant
majority of the South Korean participants located the sound in Jim’s sur-
roundings (79.1%); in contrast, only a small minority located the sound in
Jim’s mind (5.1%).20 ird, it follows from the previous two ndings that the
18 χ2 = 5.5415, p = 0.01857, two-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.283, where a value of 0.2 is ordinarily
classied as a small eect and a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect). If
we instead look at all of the participants, the dierence between the responses of the two
groups is only borderline signicant: χ2 = 8.6996, p = 0.06906 (Cramer’s V = 0.1501256,
where a value of 0.1 is ordinarily classied as a small eect and a value of 0.3 is ordinary
classied as a medium eect). It might be noted that the number of participants selecting
OptionD for each sample is worryingly small, but a Fisher’s exact test yields a similar result
(p = 0.06122).
19 Option A or B: χ2 = 60.2579, p = 4.16e− 15, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.6046, where a value
of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as
a large eect); Option C: χ2 = 180.1316, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 1.365, where
a value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
20 Option A or B: χ2 = 65.148, p = 3.474e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.6207, where a value
of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as
a large eect); Option C: χ2 = 156.25, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 1.115, where a
value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
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American and South Korean participants were similar with regard to locat-
ing the sound in Jim’s surroundings and not in his mind. Further, we found
no signicant dierences when comparing the percentage of participants in
each group selecting Options A or B (physical locations); we did, however,
nd a signicant dierence between the percentage of participants in each
group selecting Option C (mental location), although the percentages were
small in each case (5.1% vs. 1.1%).21
Again, our hypothesis did not lead us to make a prediction about the
relative preference that Americans and South Koreans might have for either
of the two physical locations for sound. at said, it is worth noting that
our data does not give us reason to suppose that there is a large dierence
between the two groups in this regard, as we found no signicant dierences
between the percentage of participants in each group selecting Option A or
between the percentage of participants in each group selecting Option B.22
Further, if we look at those participants who selected one of the two physical
locations, we do not nd a signicant dierence between the responses of the
Americans and the South Koreans.23 We did nd that each group showed a
strong preference for locating the sound on Jim’s right (where the source
of the sound is) rather than on Jim’s le (where the sound seemed to be),
however, with the American participants being over seven times more likely
to select Option A than Option B and the South Korean participants being
over six times more likely to select Option A than Option B.is dierence
was much more pronounced than it was for the pain probe and warrants
further investigation.
3.2 Study 2
It might be worried that participants in our rst study did not have strong
opinions about the questions, but that the multiple-choice format nonethe-
less forced them to select an answer. While there are reasons to doubt that
21 Option A or B: χ2 = 0.0012, p = 0.9727, two-tailed. With sample sizes of 190 and 196,
we had a power of 0.9984 to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s h = 0.5). Option C:
χ2 = 3.9937, p = 0.04567, two-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.2501, where a value of 0.2 is ordinarily
classied as a small eect and a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect).
22 Option A: χ2 = 0.0146, p = 0.9038, two-tailed; Option B: χ2 = 0.1578, p = 0.6912, two-
tailed. Again, with sample sizes of 190 and 196, for each comparison we had a power of
0.9984 to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s h = 0.5).
23 χ2 = 0.1407, p = 0.7076. With sample sizes of 155 and 149, we had a power of 0.9918 to
detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s h = 0.5). If we instead look at all of the participants,
the dierence between the responses of the two groups is only borderline signicant: χ2 =
8.6409, p = 0.07073 (Cramer’s V = 0.1496, where a value of 0.1 is ordinarily classied
as a small eect and a value of 0.3 is ordinary classied as a medium eect). It might be
noted that the number of participants selecting Options C and D for the American sample
is worryingly small, but a Fisher’s exact test yields a similar result (p = 0.06796).
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this would dramatically skew our results (see Sytsma and Livengood 2016,
Chapter 9, for discussion), our second study removed this worry by chang-
ing the question format to allow for a neutral response to each option.
Participants were given one of the two vignettes described above—either
the referred pain or the referred sound vignette—then asked how strongly
they agreed or disagreed with each of four claims using a 7-point scale an-
chored at 1 with “Strongly Disagree,” at 4 with “Neutral,” and at 7 with
“Strongly Agree.”e claims for the English version of the pain probe were:
1. e pain is in Jack’s liver and it merely feels to him as if it is in his
le arm.
2. e pain is in Jack’s le arm, just where he feels it to be.
3. e pain is in Jack’s mind, and neither in his le arm nor in his liver.
4. ere is no pain—not in Jack’s liver, in Jack’s le arm, or in Jack’s
mind.
e rst two claims give the pain a physical location (either where the dam-
age is or where the pain if felt to be), while the third claim gives it a men-
tal location and the fourth claim captures skepticism about the pain. e
claims for the sound probe followed the same schematic.24 Responses were
collected using the same websites and restrictions as the previous study. We
collected responses from 247 Americans (93 for the pain probe, 154 for the
sound probe) and from 188 South Koreans (93 for the pain probe, 95 for the
sound probe).25
In addition to participants’ responses to each of the four individual claims
we asked them about, we were interested in how their responses to the rst
two claims (assigning one of two physical locations to the pain or sound)
compared with their responses to the third claim (assigning a mental loca-
tion to the pain or sound). To test this we calculated the highest response
that each person gave to either Claim 1 or Claim 2 (MAX). We were also
interested in determining whether participants endorsed one or the other of
24e English version of the sound claims: 1.e sound is on Jim’s right and it merely sounds
to him as if it is on his le.
2.e sound is on Jim’s le, just where he hears it to be.
3.e sound is in Jim’s mind, and neither on his le nor his right.
4.ere is no sound—not on Jim’s right, on Jim’s le, or in Jim’s mind.
e Korean translations of the claims for the pain probe and the sound probe are included
in the appendix.
25 e American participants were 55.1% women, with an average age of 32.2 years; the South
Korean participants were 71.3% women, with an average age of 29.6.
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these two claims and whether they endorsed the third claim, where a par-
ticipant was counted as endorsing a claim if she selected either 5, 6, or 7 for
it on the 7-point scale. As such, we calculated the percentage endorsing ei-
ther Claim 1 or Claim 2 (PHYSICAL) and the percentage endorsing Claim 3
(MENTAL).e results—including MAX, PHYSICAL, and MENTAL—are
shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Results of Study 2 with mean response on le and percent endorsing on
right; pain case on top, sound case on bottom.
3.2.1 Pain
We will begin by looking at the results for the pain probes. Recall our three
predictions: (1) that the American participants would tend to locate the pain
in a body part and not in the mind, (2) that the South Korean participants
would also tend to locate the pain in a body part and not in the mind, and
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(3) that the two groups would be similar in this regard. Once again the data
support each of our three predictions.
First, we found that the American participants tended to give low an-
swers to the claim that the pain was in Jack’s mind (Claim 3), with the mean
response for this claim (2.22) being signicantly below the neutral point.26
Further, Americans tended to give high answers to at least one of the two
claims locating the pain in Jack’s body—either his liver (Claim 1) or his arm
(Claim2)—with themean response forMAX (5.76) being signicantly above
the neutral point.27 In addition, we found that a signicant majority en-
dorsed one of the rst two claims (81.7%), while only a minority endorsed
the third claim (10.8%).28 Finally, it is worth noting that the American par-
ticipants tended to treat the pain as either being located in the body or as
being located in the mind, with only one participant out of 93 (1.1%) failing
to endorse one of the rst three claims and only eight participants (8.6%)
endorsing both one of the rst two claims and the third claim.
Second, as with the Americans, we found that the South Korean partic-
ipants tended to give low answers to the claim that the pain was in Jack’s
mind (Claim 3), with the mean response for this claim (2.39) being signi-
cantly below the neutral point.29 Further, South Koreans also tended to give
high answers to at least one of the two claims locating the pain in Jack’s body
with the mean response for MAX (5.41) being signicantly above the neu-
tral point.30 And we again found that a signicant majority endorsed one of
the rst two claims (82.8%), while only a minority endorsed the third claim
(17.2%).31 Finally, it is worth noting that like the Americans the SouthKorean
participants tended to treat the pain as either being located in the body or as
being located in the mind, with only ve participants out of 93 (5.4%) fail-
26 t = −10.5332, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.092, where a value of 0.8 or above is
ordinarily classied as a large eect).
27 t = 14.0494, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.457, where a value of 0.8 or above is
ordinarily classied as a large eect).
28 PHYSICAL: χ2 = 36.172, p = 9.032e − 10, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.6872, where a value
of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied
as a large eect); MENTAL: χ2 = 55.7419, p = 4.132e − 14, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.9026,
where a value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
29 t = −9.3233, p = 3.029e − 15, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 0.9668, where a value of 0.8 or above
is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
30 t = 9.8081, p = 2.892e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.017, where a value of 0.8 or above is
ordinarily classied as a large eect).
31 PHYSICAL: χ2 = 38.7097, p = 2.459e − 10, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.7154, where a value
of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied
as a large eect); MENTAL: χ2 = 38.7097, p = 2.459e − 10, one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.7154,
where a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as amedium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily
classied as a large eect).
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ing to endorse one of the rst three claims and only 13 participants (14.0%)
endorsing both one of the rst two claims and the third claim.
ird, it follows from what we have just reported that the American and
South Korean participants were similar with regard to locating the pain in a
body part and not in the mind. Further, directly comparing the responses of
the two groups for Claim 3 reveals no signicant dierence.32 Likewise, there
was no signicant dierence between the percentage of Americans and the
percentage of South Koreans endorsing at least one of the rst two claims,
and therewas no signicant dierence between the percentage of Americans
and the percentage of South Koreans endorsing the third claim.33
Recall that while our hypothesis did not lead us to make a prediction
about the relative preference that Americans and South Koreans might have
for either of the two bodily locations for pain, the results of our rst study
suggested that theremight be a small cultural dierence in this regard. Based
on this nding, we predicted that we would nd similar dierences in our
second study between the mean responses of the American and South Ko-
rean participants to Claim 1 (liver) and themean responses to Claim 2 (arm).
ese predictions were not born out by the data, however: we found no sig-
nicant dierences between responses for either Claim 1 or Claim 2.34 Fur-
ther, we found no signicant dierence between the responses of the two
groups across Claims 1 and 2, or between their responses across all four
claims.35 is might not be telling the whole story, however, as suggested by
the scatterplots of responses to the rst two questions (spreading out the re-
sponses when multiple participants gave the same pattern) shown in Figure
3. In keeping with results of our rst study, we see that more responses fell
into the upper le quadrant than the lower right quadrant for each group,
indicating that more participants endorsed the claim that the pain was in
the liver while denying the claim that the pain was in the arm (26.9% US,
33.3% South Korea) than showed the reverse pattern (24.7% US, 15.1% South
Korea). Further, this preference was againmuch stronger amongst the South
Korean participants than the American participants.36
32 t = 0.7104, p = 0.4783, two-tailed.With sample sizes of 93 and 93 we had a power of 0.9239
to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s d = 0.5).
33 PHYSICAL: χ2 = 0, p = 1, two-tailed; MENTAL: χ2 = 1.1178, p = 0.2904, two-tailed.
With sample sizes of 93 and 93, for each comparison we had a power of 0.9264 to detect a
medium-sized eect (Cohen’s h = 0.5).
34 Claim 1: t = 0.3337, p = 0.3695, one-tailed; Claim 2: t = −0.3832, p = 0.351, one-tailed.
With sample sizes of 93 and 93, for each comparison we had a power of 0.9601 to detect a
medium-sized eect (Cohen’s d = 0.5).
35 Claims 1 and 2: Pillai’s trace= 0.00104, F(2, 183) = 0.09521, p = 0.9092. Claims 1-4: Pillai’s
trace= 0.004359, F(4, 181) = 0.198, p = 0.9391.
36 Classifying participants as either endorsing a claim (selecting 5, 6, or 7), denying a claim
(selecting 1, 2, or 3), or neutral (selecting 4), we found a signicant dierence between
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Fig. 3. Scatterplots for responses to Question 1 (y-axis) and Question 2 (x-axis)
for Study 2, spreading out the responses when multiple participants fell on the
same point.
3.2.2 Sound
e results of our second study also supported each of our three predictions
with regard to the referred sound case. (1) We found that the American par-
ticipants tended to give low answers to Claim 3 (2.19), with only a small mi-
nority endorsing this claim (10.4%), and high answers to either Claim 1 or
Claim 2 (5.62), with a signicant majority (78.6%) endorsing at least one of
these claims.37 (2)e South Korean participants tended to give low answers
to Claim 3 (2.28), with only a small minority endorsing this claim (11.6%),
the pattern of responses to Claims 1 and 2 given by Americans and by South Koreans.
Distinguishing between those participants who denied both claims (lower le quadrants
in Figure 3), those who endorsed both claims (upper right quadrants), those who endorsed
Claim 1 anddeniedClaim 2 (upper le quadrants), thosewhodeniedClaim 2 and endorsed
Claim 1 (lower right quadrants), and those who were neutral with regard to one or the
other of the claims (falling on the dividing lines between quadrants), we get χ2 = 12.556,
p = 0.01366 (Cramer’s V = 0.2598, where a value of 0.1 is ordinarily classied as a small
eect and a value of 0.3 is ordinary classied as a medium eect). It might be noted that
the number of participants falling into the lower le quadrant for the American sample is
worryingly small, but a Fisher’s exact test yields a similar result (p = 0.01329).
37 Claim 3: t = −12.8065, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.032, where a value of 0.8
or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect); MENTAL: χ2 = 95.0714, p < 2.2e − 16,
one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.9144, where a value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a
large eect); MAX: t = 14.8749, p < 2.2e − 16 (Cohen’s d = 1.197, where a value of 0.8 or
above is ordinarily classied as a large eect); PHYSICAL: χ2 = 49.1494, p = 1.186e − 12
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and high answers to either Claim 1 or Claim 2 (5.12), with a signicantmajor-
ity (80.0%) endorsing at least one of these claims.38 (3) We found no signif-
icant dierence between the responses of the American and the South Ko-
rean participants for Claim 3, between the percentages endorsing this claim,
or between the percentages endorsing either Claim 1 or Claim 2.39
Recall that while our hypothesis did not lead us to make a prediction
about the relative preference that Americans and South Koreans might have
for either of the two physical locations for sound, our rst study found no
signicant dierences between the two groups in this regard. Based on this
nding, we did not expect to nd signicant dierences between the mean
responses to Claim 1 (right) and the mean responses to Claim 2 (le) be-
tween the American and South Korean participants in our second study.
Against our expectations, we found signicant dierences between the re-
sponses for both Claim 1 and Claim 2, with the American participants show-
ing a stronger preference than the South Korean participants for locating the
sound where the source is rather than where it seems to be.40 is nding is
worthy of further study. Finally, we again found that each group was signi-
cantly more likely to locate the sound on Jim’s right (where the source of the
sound is) than on Jim’s le (where the sound seemed to be), although this
preference was not as pronounced as in the rst study.41
(Cohen’s h = 0.6082, where a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a
value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as a large eect).
38 Claim 3: t = −10.3099, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.058, where a value of 0.8
or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect); MENTAL: χ2 = 54.5684, p = 7.506e − 14,
one-tailed (Cohen’s h = 0.8764, where a value of 0.8 or above is ordinarily classied as a
large eect); MAX: t = 7.615, p = 1.017e − 11 (Cohen’s d = 0.7813, where a value of 0.5 is
ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as a large
eect); PHYSICAL: χ2 = 33.0105, p = 4.583e − 09 (Cohen’s h = 0.6435, where a value of
0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as a
large eect).
39 Claim 3: t = 0.4391, p = 0.6611 (with sample sizes of 154 and 95 we had a power of 0.9684
to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s d = 0.5)); MENTAL: χ2 = 0.007, p = 0.9335
(with sample sizes of 154 and 95 we had a power of 0.9694 to detect a medium-sized eect
(Cohen’s d = 0.5)); PHYSICAL: χ2 = 0.0119, p = 0.9133 (again, with sample sizes of 154
and 95 we had a power of 0.9694 to detect a medium-sized eect (Cohen’s d = 0.5)).
40Claim 1: t = −4.298, p = 2.729e−05, two-tailed (Cohen’s d = 0.5658, where a value of 0.5 is
ordinarily classied as a medium eect and a value of 0.8 is ordinarily classied as a large
eect); Claim 2: t = 2.0893, p = 0.03797, two-tailed (Cohen’s d = 0.2732, where a value
of 0.2 is ordinarily classied as a small eect and a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a
medium eect).
41 Americans: t = 9.5749, p < 2.2e − 16, one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 1.334, where a value of 0.8
or above is ordinarily classied as a large eect); South Koreans: t = 2.7768, p = 0.003313,
one-tailed (Cohen’s d = 0.4715, where a value of 0.2 is ordinarily classied as a small eect
and a value of 0.5 is ordinarily classied as a medium eect).
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4. Discussion
Previous empirical studies have indicated that amajority of English speakers
think dierently about the nature of pain than philosophers typically claim.
ese studies suggest that instead of conceiving of pains as mental states,
they conceive of them as bodily states. As such, while we agree with Aydede
(2006) andHill (2006) that both the phenomenology of feeling pain and the
surface grammar of our pain reports indicate a bodily conception of pain, we
disagreewith their assertion that this represents a recessive strand in people’s
thinking about pain. Instead we hold that the ordinary conception of pains
treats them as bodily states, and we hold that this conception is driven by
the two factors that Aydede and Hill note.
In this paper, we directly investigated our proposal by asking three ques-
tions:
1. Would an empirical study conrmprevious results that people think
of pains as bodily states even if the felt location of pain is dissociated
from the bodily disorder in a person’s body?
2. Do cultural dierences between Americans and South Koreans in-
uence people’s thinking about the location of pain, challenging the
importance of the phenomenology of feeling pain and the surface
grammar of pain reports?
3. Are the response proles regarding the location of pains and sounds
similar, indicating that people consider both pains and sounds to be
perceptible objects?
e data that we presented in Section 3 strongly suggest a positive answer to
the rst and third question and a negative answer to the second one. In this
section we will consider each of these three questions, discussing our results
and looking at possible objections.
4.1 e bodily conception of pain conrmed
e referred pain scenariowas chosen because it questionswhether and how
much the phenomenology of feeling pain as well as the semantics of pain re-
ports play a role in our thinking about the nature of pain. In most painful
situations, we feel pain where a bodily disorder has occurred.e referred
pain case dissociates the phenomenology of feeling pain from the bodily dis-
order. Furthermore, we usually report the location of a pain to be where we
presume the bodily disorder is located. Again, the referred pain case pro-
vides a violation of this statistical norm. Of course, if people hold that pains
are mental states—as the philosophical orthodoxy asserts—then these dis-
sociations should be of no concern: if pains are mental states that are caused
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by bodily disorders, then a given pain might incorrectly represent the loca-
tion of the disorder. In contrast, if people hold a bodily conception of pain,
then the location of pain may either follow the felt location or, alternatively,
may be identied with the location of the bodily disorder.
e results of our studies show that people reject the view that pains
are mental states. In each study, a large majority answered that the pain was
in one of the bodily locations, while only a small minority answered that it
was located in the mind.us, this investigation conrms previous studies
in suggesting a dominant bodily conception of pain. Our studies, however,
diverged from many previous studies in explicitly asking people about the
location of pain rather than inquiring about the possibility of shared pains,
unfelt pains, or pain hallucinations.42
Some people might nd themethodology of asking participants directly
about the location of a pain to be problematic, however.is objection can
be specied in two primary ways, neither of which we nd convincing. First,
it might be argued that laypeople do not talk about mental states quamen-
tal states, or the mind quamind. Consequently, asking people whether they
think of pains as located in the mind, so the objection goes, is too far re-
moved from people’s ordinary talk. However, it is important to note that
we did not conduct a corpus-linguistic study on pain reports, testing peo-
ple’s use of certain terminology. Instead, we attempted to directly tap into
people’s conception of pain. People certainly understand the phrase ‘in my
mind’ and hence are capable of evaluating the plausibility that pains are not
in the body but in a person’s mind. Moreover, if this objection were success-
ful, we should expect a much greater number of participants to have chosen
Option E in our rst study—“None of the above: I don’t agree with any of
these statements.”—but only a small minority did so. Similarly, we would ex-
pect a large percentage of participants to select the neutral response to the
questions in our second study, but again this was not the case. For example,
only 14% of the American participants and 10% of the South Korean partici-
pants gave the neutral response to the question asking whether the pain was
located in the mind.
Second, a more promising version of this objection highlights the sec-
ond of the two factors that we’ve discussed, noting that the semantics of pain
reports is such that pains are located in body parts and not in the mind. It
would then be argued that people didn’t answer that the pain is located in
themind simply because this violates the semantics of ordinary pain reports,
which they nd hard to accept. Again, we do not nd this objection convinc-
ing: advocates of the view that pains are thought to be mental states need to
explain why pains are reported to be in body parts, even though they are
42 See the second study in (Sytsma 2010a), however, for an exception.
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not really located there. Arguably, the most plausible account considers a
statement like ‘there is pain in my hand’ as shorthand for ‘I feel a pain that
is caused by my hand.’ If that were the case, however, then the participants
in our study should not have located pains in bodily locations, because our
scenario was specically designed to make salient the independence of the
phenomenological component and the bodily disorder.
Before we continue with an analysis of the cross-cultural part of this
study, we would like to give an interpretation of people’s “bodily” responses
to the referred pain case. We were particularly interested in nding out
whether people would identify pains with bodily disorders or give prior-
ity to the felt location of the pains. Our results do not strongly support ei-
ther option, however, and overall they suggest that neither option is a clearly
dominant factor in the ordinary conception of pain.
ere are at least two possible explanations for this outcome. First, dis-
sociations between bodily disorders and the phenomenology of feeling pain
are rare and hard to evaluate. us, it is not unlikely that people felt un-
certain about what to make of the referred pain scenario and either had no
strong preference for either view or were sincerely torn between both op-
tions. Second, it might be argued that the bodily conception of pain is not
unitary. According to this explanation, one group of people strongly identi-
es pains with bodily disorders, and considers the felt location of pain to be
an overridable indication of where the bodily disorder has occurred, while
a second group of people takes the felt location of pain to be paramount for
purposes of determining the location of pain, with bodily disorders merely
being causes of bodily pains.
While a more thorough investigation is called for, there are at least two
reasons to expect that the bodily conception of pain is not unitary. First,
as seen in the scatterplots in Figure 3, nearly half of the participants in our
second study endorsed one of the two claims while denying the other (51.6%
of the Americans and 48.4% of the South Koreans). We also nd that these
participants were split with regard to which of the two claims they endorsed,
with 52.1% of the Americans and 68.9% of the South Koreans endorsing the
rst claim.43
Second, aer answering the forced-choice questions in Study 1, theAmer-
ican participants were asked to explain their answer choice. A qualitative
analysis of these responses suggests several divergent lines of thought. With
regard to the explanations given for locating the pain where the damage was,
43 We should also mention, however, that a sizable minority of the participants either gave
a neutral response to one or the other of the two claims or endorsed both claims (47.3%
of the Americans, 44.1% of the South Koreans), which oers some support for the rst
explanation given above.
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a substantial number of participants noted the plausibility of an appearance-
reality distinction for pain. Representative examples include that “pain from
one area of the body may present itself in another area of the body” and
that “the pain is not as it seems.”e second most common explanation was
to defer to the presumed expertise of the doctor. For example, participants
wrote that “it can be proven that the pain is in Jack’s liver by a trained med-
ical professional,” that “the doctor has experience and has also run tests to
assure that the problem is indeed in Jack’s liver, regardless of how Jack feels,”
and that “the Dr. has studied well and ran conrmation tests and has a better
physiological understanding.” It seems that for these andmany other partic-
ipants, the pain is located where the “problem” is, and thatmedical praction-
ers are in the best position to determine the location of that problem.
With regard to the explanations given for locating the painwhere it is felt
to be, participants again frequently appealed to authority; this time it was not
the physician’s authority, however, but Jack’s authority as the person feeling
the pain. For instance, participants wrote “that’s where he said his pain is
and people know how they feel,” “if Jack said its in his arm, its in the arm;
only Jack knows what hurt him in his body,” and “the important thing here is
Jack’s perspective.” And other participants focused on the felt location of the
pain without specically noting Jack’s authority: “his arm hurts regardless
of the actual infection being in his liver,” “Jack can still have pain in his le
arm, even if the pain is the result of an infection in a dierent area of his
body,” “regardless of what is wrong with Jack internally, he still feels pain
in his arm.” Such explanations suggest that these participants hold that we
should take the phenomenal aspect of pains at face value, even if the bodily
disorder occurs at a dierent place.
While we prefer to refrain from drawing strong conclusions from these
explanations, they are suggestive of the claim that there are multiple bodily
conceptions of pain: whereas one group focuses on the location of the bodily
disorder, the other seems to identify the location of the pain with where it is
felt to be.
4.2 Cultural eects on people’s conception of pain
In Section 2 we noted that investigating the conception of pain amongst
South Koreans provides an interesting contrast to studies examining how
Westerners think about pain. Specically, we suggested that if people’s views
on the location and nature of pain are molded by cultural factors, then it is
likely that there would be dierences in this regard between South Koreans
and Americans. However, we also expressed skepticism about nding any
such dierences. According to our own account, people’s thinking about the
location of pain is dominated by the phenomenology of feeling pain as well
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as the semantics of pain reports. Given the lack of any known dierences in
the felt and reported location of pains between Americans and South Kore-
ans, we hypothesized that no dierence would be found.
e results of our studies are in line with our hypothesis. Of course, a
lack of evidence does not prove that cultural factors have no inuence on
the basic conception of pain. Nonetheless, given our positive results and the
power of our studies, if such an eect exists it is likely to be small. Most im-
portantly, across our studies a large majority of each group endorsed a bod-
ily view, while only a small minority of either group endorsed amental-state
view. In regards to the two possible bodily locations our data is less clear. In
Study 1, a marginally signicant eect was found indicating that South Ko-
reansmore oen locate pains where the bodily disorder is found.e results
for our second study were more mixed, but the scatterplots shown in Figure
3 oer some additional support. We found that roughly half of each group
endorsed one location claim while denying the other, with the Americans
being roughly evenly split between the two camps, while the South Koreans
were twice as likely to locate the pain where the disorder is found thanwhere
it is felt to be.
ese results are consistent with the considerations we presented in Sec-
tion 2, including both the tendency toward collectivist thinking present in
South Korea and the phenomenon of Hwa-byung. Observable bodily dis-
orders are undoubtedly physical realities and the possession of them does
not constitute a loss of face within one’s community. In contrast, the phe-
nomenology of feeling pain is hidden and can be more readily suppressed,
with it oen being the case that feelings of pain are not talked about or are
otherwise considered to be improper topics of discourse. As such, it would
not be surprising if South Koreans focus more on the location of the bodily
disorder compared to the phenomenology of feeling pain.
4.3 Pains vs. sounds
In addition to examining people’s conception of pain, we investigated
whether people take sounds to be (a) located at their source, (b) located
where they are heard to be, or (c) located in the mind.e aim of this part
of our studies was to examine whether the response prole regarding the
location of pains mirrors the response prole of a typical sensory object
like sound. e results indicate that people treat pains similarly to sounds
in terms of taking them to be located outside of the mind. We also found an
interesting dierence in the respective response proles, however. Whereas
both Americans and South Koreans seemed to have been torn between lo-
cating pain at the source (liver) or the felt location (arm) of the pain, most
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Americans and most South Koreans located the sound at its source and not
where it seemed to be coming from.
is observed discrepancymight be accounted for by what philosophers
of pain have called the privacy of pains. Pains are considered private in the
sense of being felt only by a single person. With regard to the ordinary con-
ception of pain, however, empirical evidence indicates that this is not taken
to be a necessary feature of pains, but merely contingent on the fact that
people do not typically share their bodies (Sytsma 2010a). Even though the
doctor is able to locate the bodily disorder in Jack’s liver in our scenario, she
is not able to feel Jack’s pain.e privacy of pains also means that people are
usually thought to be the ultimate authority with regards to their own pains.
In contrast, the heard sound of the ambulance is not private to Jim, but can
be heard by both Jim and the expert.us, the dierence in results can be
explained by the fact that many people hold Jack to be the authority over his
pain: if he says he feels the pain in his arm, that’s where the pain must be
located. A similar strategy is not available for reasoning about sounds.
5. Conclusion
Philosophers have generally held that pain is amental state and that this view
reects the ordinary conception of pain. If this is correct, then the obvious
answer to the question ‘Where is your pain?’ is that it is in yourmind. In this
article we reported the results of two cross-cultural studies testing whether
Americans and SouthKoreans give the response predicted by the philosoph-
ical orthodoxy. And we found that they do not: rather than conceiving of
pains as mental states, the data suggest that both groups overwhelmingly
conceive of pains as bodily states. Additionally, our studies reveal two fur-
ther points of interest for further research on the ordinary conception of
pain. First, despite there being notable cross-cultural dierences between
Americans and South Koreans that might be expected to inuence how they
understand pain, these dierences seem to have at most a minor eect on
their conceptions of pain. is supports our view that the cross-culturally
universal aspects of felt and reported location shape people’s conception of
pain. Second, both Americans and South Koreans seem to be divided be-
tween thinking that pains should be identied with bodily disorders on the
one hand, and thinking that pains are located where they feel their pains
to be on the other hand. us, although we were able to provide a general
answer to the question of where people take their pains to be—namely, they
tend to locate pains in the body—additional work is needed for a full account
of the ordinary conception of pain.
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Appendix
Referred pain vignette in Korean:
철수는몸상태가안좋아서병원에오게되었다.




사는 철수에게 철수 그 자신이 어떻게 느끼던 간에, 왼쪽 팔에는 아무런
문제가없고진짜문제가있는부분은그의간이라고설명해주었다.
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4. 소리는 없다–영희의 왼쪽이나 오른쪽, 혹은 그의 마음 어디에도
없다.
